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Judicial Precedent (1)

JUDICIAL PRECEDENT (1)

 

Editor’s Comments

The doctrine of judicial precedent plays a vital role in the legal system. Students must be able to analyse the practical application of the doctrine and discuss about concept of judicial creativity. Hence it is necessary for the students to be familiar with the role of the modern judiciary today in the context of applying previous decisions to present cases. It is equally important to consider in the context of judicial creativity, whether the doctrine of judicial precedent is a myth, and non-existent? In another words, if judges actually overrule or depart from previous decisions, what is therefore the value of the doctrine of precedent in the administration of justice? Is it a rule of law or is it merely evidence of the law? A good answer would require students to cite recent decisions and place particular emphasis upon the attitudes of judges demonstrated in the process of judicial decision making.

Introduction – What is the meaning of Judicial Precedent?

· The term judicial precedent has at least 2 meanings:

  1. The process whereby judges follow previously decided cases.
  2. It is referring to the decided cases – a “precedent” which may be relied on in the future.

· The doctrine of judicial precedent is based on the notion of stare decisis, meaning to stand by cases already decided, and therefore judges would be expected to decide like cases alike.

· Stare decisis has two aspects: one concerns the hierarchy of the courts: the place of a court within the structure of decision making; and the other concerns the precedential weight or status of a particular decision.

· It is important to appreciate that the limitations placed on the courts by the principle of stare decisis are self – imposed. There are no legislative provisions on the applications of Judicial Precedent, with 2 notable exceptions:

i) Our courts must follow decisions on community law given by the European Court (European Communities Act 1972, S3 (1)).

ii) By virtue of S2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, when our courts and tribunals decide questions in connection with rights guaranteed under the ECHR, and given effect to the UK by the 1998 Act, they must take into account relevant judgements, decisions declarations and opinions of the European Court of Human Rights.

Why is Judicial Precedent so important in the English Legal System?

Students would require an understanding of the following:-

(a) the concept of separation of powers : emphasizes the symbolic function and political relationship between the courts and the legislature;

(b) to prevent retrospective law-making;

(c) the fact that judges do not speak in this way;

(d) the administrative factors : the elimination of delay and reduction of cost primarily; the benefits of 'routine procedure" in the application of previous decisions as a curb on arbitrariness;

(e) to provide objectivity in the law : "like cases to be treated alike";

(f) to maintain the social values of predictability;

(g) to produce expectations and the power of expectations to become normative;

(h) to achieve a universal sense of justice.

Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dictum

· A ratio decidendi of a case is the principle of law on which the decision is based, i.e the reasoning.

· The judge may go on to speculate about what his decision would or might be if the fact of the case had been different. This is an obiter dictum – something said by the way.

· Ratio decidendi is the binding part of a judicial decision.

· Obiter dictum may be of persuasive authority but it is not binding in later cases because it was not strictly relevant to the matter in issue in the original case.

What weight should be given to the doctrine?

The factors to be taken into consideration are as following:

(a) the status of the statement – ie. whether it is the ration or the obiter of the decision;

(b) the court that decided the case within the hierarchical structure ;

(c) the type of judge involved in that particular decision;

(d) the question as to whether there was a dissenting judgment;

(e) the period when the case was decided;

(f) the status of the precedent with respect to how it fits with the surrounding law;

(g) the status of the decision in a later case;

(h) the reputation that the precedent generally enjoys.

Mechanisms Available to Judges to Depart from Precedents

In the examination, the issue that could arise is whether the doctrine of precedent is flexible in nature as a result of the various judicial attitudes to the extent that it might be diminishing in value and becoming a myth today. The following mechanism enable the judges to depart from previous decisions in their exercise of discretion :

1. Reversing :

This is simply overturning the decisions of an earlier court when it is heard on appeal. The appeal court will then substitute its own decision. ( It is possible to apply both the mechanisms of reversing and overruling in the same case.)

2. Distinguishing :

The doctrine is inoperative if a previous case can be distinguished. This arises where a case is sufficiently dissimilar on its material facts and the previous rule need not be followed. A case can only be distinguished on the material facts and if it is reasonable to do so, but what is reasonable differs according to the judges. If the notion is carried to an extreme length then judges can avoid an unpleasant consequence by simply distinguishing a previous case though it would have been proper to apply the previous case. What is reasonable is left to the discretion of the judge and this causes a certain amount of uncertainty.

3. Overruling :

A court of competent jurisdiction within the hierarchy of the courts may declare the decision of a previous case no longer good law. There are reasons for doing this :-

(i) The previous court did not correctly interpret the law;

(ii) The later court considers that the law contained in the previous ratio should no longer be applicable. Re United of Railways of Havana & Regla Warehouse was overruled by Miliangos v George Frank where the former held that damages in breach of contract could only be given in sterling pounds. It was held in the latter case that the decision of Havana was contrary to the commercial demands of the time.

Overruling not only affects future cases but also the present one. It is therefore said to be retrospective, ie. even though that case started before the precedent was overruled, it nevertheless is decided according to the new law. This may seem unfair to parties who may have relied on that precedent only to find that it is overruled on appeal. It has been suggested that overruling should be prospective, ie. deciding that a previous decision is wrong but only treating it as overruled in future cases. However, it is submitted that this could lead to greater injustice and complications. Law, as a social factor, must serve the public otherwise injustice may be done.

Overruling is one important method by which the doctrine of precedent is kept flexible. When a decision is overruled, the authority is no longer binding either on subsequent courts or the court itself which is overruling.

4. Per incuriam

Judges need not to follow a previous decision if its given “per incuriam”. It means previous decision has been reached through “carelessness or ignorance of a certain law of binding decision of House of Lords. This application is very limited, only 3 circumstances which allows ‘per incuriam”

A) Where previous precedent was clearly wrong

B) Where the life or liberty of a person is at stake

C) Where it is unlikely for the

Are precedents laws or only evidence of the law?

· An important jurisprudential debate as to whether judges make law or whether they simply declare the law, and whether precedent are law or only evidence of the law. 18th century, Blackstone: “The decisions of courts of justices are the evidence of what is common law.”

· 1892: Lord Esher in Willis v Baddeley (1892):

“There is in fact no such thing as judge-made law, for the judges do not make the law though they frequently have to apply existing law to circumstances as to which it had not previously been authoritatively laid down that such law is applicable”

· Professor Cross (1977) argued that Blackstone and Esher’s views were wrong. A rule stated in a precedent, “is law properly so called and law because it was made by the judges, not because it originated from common law in common usage, or the judge’s idea of justice and public convenience.”

· So far as Lord Esher’s statement was concerned, the application of existing law to new circumstances could never clearly be distinguished from the creation of a new rule of law. If there were no such thing as judge-made law, it would be impossible to account for the evolution of much legal doctrine which had been formulated by the judges and no one but the judges.

“If a previous decision were only evidence of what the law is, no judge could ever b e absolutely bound to follow it, and it could ever be effectively overruled because a subsequent judge might always treat it as having some evidential value.”

· Lord Radcliffe:

“There was never a more sterile controversy than that upon the question whether a judge makes law. Of course he does. How can he help it?”

This leaves open the question whether there is not also the merit in the declaratory theory of law and in the theory that precedents are evidence of law rather than law itself.

· When a judge declares a point of law, he is declaring what he finds the law on that point to be. He is not saying what he thinks it ought to be but what he believes it is. In giving his opinion as to what the law is, he may have added something new to the existing corpus of the law. Many decisions on points of law add something new in this sense and can therefore be said to be “making the law”. From the judge’s point of view, his function is to declare the law. From the point of view of the observer, he may be, in declaring it, added something new or even changes the law. The “declaratory theory”, and ‘the judge-do-make-law theory”, therefore appear to be right.

Values promoted by the system of precedent

A catalogue of the values promoted by the common law system of precedent was drawn up by Professor Hart and Sacks of the Harvard Law School (1958):

  1. In Furtherance of Private Ordering

a) Desirability of enabling people to plan their affairs. Having confidence that they comply with the law so they will not be entangled in litigation.

b) Desirability of providing private counsel so far as possible with stable bases of reasoning. Desirability of encouraging the remedial processes of private settlement by minimising the incentives of the private parties to try to secure from a different judge a different decision that has been given by the same or other judges in the past.

  1. In Furtherance of Fair and Effective Adjudication

a) Desirability (from the point of view of the litigants) of expediting litigation and minimising its cost by sparing them the necessity of re-litigating every relevant proposition in every case.

b) The need (from the point of view of the judicial system) of facilitating the dispatch of business – indeed, the impossibility of re-examining de novo every relevant proposition in every case.

c) Need of discouraging a rush of litigation wherever there is change of personnel on the bench.

d) Desirability (from he point of view of fairness to the litigants) of securing a reasonably uniformity of decision throughout the judicial system, both at any given and from one time to another.

e) Desirability of promoting genuine impersonality of decision by minimising the elements of personal discretion, and of facilitating the operation of the check of professional criticism.

f) The propriety of according respect of the conclusions of predecessor judges.

g) Injustice of disappointing expectations fairly generated at the stage of primary private activity.

  1. In furtherance of public confidence in the judiciary

a) Desirability of maximising the acceptability of decisions and the importance of this end of popular and professional confidence in

i. the impersonality of decisions, AND

ii. Their reasoned foundation.

b) The necessity, considering the amorphous[1] nature of the limits upon judicial power and the usual absence of an effective political check at the ballot box, that judges be subject to the discipline and the restraint of an obligation to build upon the prior law on fashion which can withstand the test of professional criticism.

Problems Associated with the Law-making by Judges and the Doctrine of Precedent

  1. Over-emphasis of the importance of individual decisions.

  1. Creates law which may upset expectations with no advance notice to those likely to be affected.

  1. The system depends on the accidents of litigation. A bad decision may stand for many years. Example: R v Caldwell (1982) causes injustice in Elliot v C (1983). Only in 2003 – R v G and Another (2003) overruled Caldwell.

  1. Tends to be backward-looking and conservative, thus slow to reapond to changing needs.

  1. Once a point has been decided at the level of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords, it tends to remain the law whether or not it is apt for the situation.

  1. Often technical problems associated with the fact that the judges give separate decisions so that it is difficult to ascertain what the ratio decidendi is, or a judge may give several reasons for his decision so it makes it difficult for lawyers to discover the ratio as it is obscure. Also the proliferation of precedents makes it difficult for lawyers to discover what the law is.

  1. The Doctrine of Judicial Precedent focuses attention on minute differences of fact between cases at the expense of the consideration of principle and policy.

Flexibility and stability in the Common Law System

· It is not the system, but the judges that create the balance between flexibility and stability. However, the system itself does not permit both stability and flexibility. There is a strong tendency to follow the precedents whether they are binding or not and whether or not the precedent seems a wise one.

· A doctrine of precedent that progressed on the basis that precedent would only be followed when the court agreed with the decision reached in the earlier case, would be a weak doctrine. Equally, it would dissipate much of the benefit of stability to which the system of precedent aspires.

· On the other hand, there is no doubt that the doctrine does lead to the perpetuation[2], sometimes for long periods, of bad conditions. Courts sometimes lack the energy to change them.

· However, the doctrine of precedent has many gaps to permit judges wishing to avail themselves to the opportunity to refuse to be crabbed by it :

a) House of Lords is not bound by its decisions, nor is the High Court and the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) is only lightly bound.

b) List of exceptions to the rule that the Court of Appeal is bound by its decisions – Young v Bristol Aeroplanes.

c) Distinguishment

d) Appeal system allows any principle of common law to be challenged and thus changed by a court high enough in the hierarchy.

· A different source of flexibility in the system is that judges can manipulate precedents, logic, social policy and all the other bases of arguments presented to them by counsel in anyway they please. This is not something is usually acknowledged, but it emerged with great force from an important article by 2 lectures at London School of Economics in (1981-82). Their paper demonstrates that frequently, the judges dealt with precedent by simply asserting that it was or was not relevant, with no explaination or reasoning to justify the assertion. Case law was sometimes described and discussed at length and at other time, was simply rejected as being “unhelpful” without discussion in general, the quality of reasoning in their Lordships’ judgements in the House of Lords proved to be less impressive than one would have expected.

· If this is true of judgements in the House of Lords, how much likely is it to be true of judgements in the lower courts?

Points to ponder :

Are there more advantages of adhering to judicial precedent?

Advantages & disadvantages of the Doctrine of Precedent

1. Convenient time-saving device

· If a problem has already arisen and been solved in a certain way, it is natural in every walk of life to reach the same conclusion on the same problem without too much reconsideration.

· The English Legal System has a doctrine of binding precedent under which the previous case must be followed in the subsequent case.

· However, it must always be remembered that decided cases are illustrations of principles of law which a judge may turn to in deciding the case before him. Precedents should be used as “stepping-stones” rather than as “halting-places” – Birch v Brown (1931) as per Lord Macmillan. The convenience of following precedents should not be allowed to degenerate into a mere mechanical exercise performed without any thought. So the citation of authority in court should be kept within reasonable bounds because it can be costly in terms of time and money.

· Lord Diplock has warned of the “danger of so binding the court with case that it has difficulty in seeing the wood of legal principle for the trees of paraphrase”.

2. Greater certainty

  • The most important advantaged claimed for the doctrine of Judicial Precedent. From this advantage, other benefits flow.
  • Existence of a precedent may prevent a judge making a mistake which he might have made if he had been left on his own without any guidance.
  • It may also allow persons generally to order their affairs and come to settlements with a certain amount of confidence.
  • But, the advantage of certainty is lost where there are too many cases or they are too confusing. This can arise through the process of distinguishing cases and over-refining the principles embodied in them.
  • Certainty in the law can only result from a large body of case law if the cases are uniform in outcome and not reconcilable.

3. The doctrine of precedent may serve the interests of justice.

  • This is one of the objections to the perspective overruling of cases, but retrospective overruling is also affected by it.The overruling of an earlier case may cause injustice to those who have ordered their affairs in reliance on it.
  • Problem: The application of precedent may produce justice in the individual case but injustice in the generality of cases. It would be undesirable to treat a number of claimants unjustly because one binding case had laid down an unjust rule.

4. Interests of justice also demand impartiality from the judge.

  • This may be assured by the existence of a binding precedent which he must follow unless it is distinguishable.

5. Case law is practical in character.

  • Based on the experience of actual cases brought about before the courts rather than on logic or theory.
  • The doctrine of stare decisis is a limiting factor in the development of judge-made law.
  • Practical law is founded on experience but the scope of further experience is restricted if the first case is binding.

6. Making of law in decided cases offers opportunities for growth and legal development which could not be provided by parliament.

  • Courts can more quickly lay down new principles, or extend old principles, to meet new circumstances. There has built up over the centuries a mass of cases illustrative of a vast number of the principles of English Law. The cases exemplify the law in the sort of detail that could not be achieved in a long code of the continental type.
  • But, therein lies another weakness of case law. Its very bulk and complexity make it increasingly difficult to find the law.

7. Flexible

  • A judge is free to lay down whatever rule he considers desirable in order to keep the law in step with changing social and economic conditions.
  • But, a judge is not thus free where there is a binding precedent.His discretion is thereby limited and the alleged flexibility of case law becomes rigidity.
  • Judicial mistakes of the past are perpetuated unless bad decisions happen to come before the House of Lord for reconsideration.
  • Flexibility and certainty are incompatible features of judge-made law.
  • A system that was truly flexible could not at the same time be certain because no one can predict when and how legal development will take place.



[1] Amorphous – without a clear defined shape or form

[2] Perpetuate – cause to continue indefinitely