Automatism
AUTOMATISM
It must be
shown that A committed the actus
If it can
be shown that A's act was not willed, ie. it was INVOLUNTARY,
then it means that there has been no ACT on the part of A and therefore there
is no actus
INVOLUNTARY
ACT = NO ACT = NO AR = NO CRIME.
A's plea
of involuntariness is the plea of automatism. This plea of automatism operates
as a defence and for examination purposes can be referred to as the DEFENCE
OF NON-INSANE AUTOMATISM
At the
outset, it is important to make a distinction between insane automatism
and non-insane automatism.
The
Comparison Between Insane Automatism and Non-Insane Automatism.
INSANE AUTOMATISM NON-INSANE AUTOMATISM
(DEFENCE
OF INSANITY)
(a) Caused
by INTERNAL (a) Caused usually by an
factor EXTERNAL factor
(b)
Defence for all crimes (b) Defence for all
crimes
(c) If
raised successfully, (c) If raised successfully
verdict of not guilty verdict
of acquittal
by reason of insanity
(d) Effect
of verdict is (d)
Effect is total acquittal
governed by Criminal discharge
Procedure
(Insanity)
(Fitness
To Plead) Act,
1991 ie. there
can be a
suspension and treatment
order, a guardianship
order, order admitting to
hospital for limited or
unlimited period or a
discharge
An
important aspect of the distinction between insane automatism and non-insane
automatism, is the external /internal point. If the cause is EXTERNAL it
can never be insanity and more often than not, it is the defence of non-insane
automatism. This was held by the C/A in the case of R v Quick & Paddison (1973).
Definition
of Non-Insane Automatism :
Lord Denning in Bratty v A-G for
In Watmore v Jenkins (1962) 2 QB 572, the
court held that the term automatism
connoted no wider or looser concept than an involuntary movement of
the body or limbs of the person.
The same
definition followed in Broome v Perkins
(1987).
The case
of R v Charlson (1955) 1 All E R 859 it
was held that the test is whether A was acting as an automaton without any
control or knowledge of the act which he was committing.
To
establish the defence of automatism, two elements must be proven.
(a)
There must be a total destruction of control. This is
seen in the cases of Watmore v Jenkins
and Broome v Perkins (1987) and more
recently in the case of AG Reference (No
2) of 1992, (1993). A substantial destruction of control does not suffice.
At this
point in must be remembered that not being able to remember the events does not
necessarily mean a total destruction of control . This was very clearly stated
in the case of Bratty v AG for
(b) The next element that must be established
is that the state of automatism must
not be self induced. Here it is important to make the distinction between a crime of pecific intention
and a crime of basic intention. For, self
induced automatism IS a defence to a crime of specific intention but NOT to a crime of basic intention.
In R v Bailey (1983), where having referred to DPP v Majewski and R v Lipman Griffiths LJ, stated
that a similar rule as the rule with regards intoxication should be applied as
a matter of public policy to all cases of self-induced automatism.
With regards
to the question of whether the defendant is reckless or not [if he is reckless,
then the state of automatism is self-induced and the defendant will be liable
for a crime of basic intention]: R v
Bailey
Griffiths LJ
stated that there may be a material
distinction between a person who consumes alcohol or dangerous drugs and a
person who fails to take sufficient food after insulin to avert hypoglycaemia.
It is common knowledge that those who take alcohol to excess or certain sorts
of drugs may become aggressive or do dangerous things; they may be able to
foresee the risks of causing harm to others, but nevertheless persist in their
conduct. But the same cannot be said, without more, of a man who fails to take
food after insulin. If he does appreciate the risk that such a failure may lead
to aggressive, unpredictable and uncontrollable conduct and he nevertheless
deliberately runs the risk or otherwise disregards it, this will amount to
recklessness, but we certainly do not think that it is common knowledge, even
among diabetics, that such is a consequence of
a failure to take food, and there is no evidence that this was known to the defendant.
Doubtless, he knew that if he failed to take his insulin or proper food after
insulin, he might lose consciousness, but as such he would only be a danger to
himself unless he put himself in charge of some machine such as a motor car,
which required his continued conscious control.
In our judgment, self-induced automatism other than that due to
intoxication from alcohol or drugs, may provide a defence to crimes of basic
intent. The question in each case will be whether the prosecution has proven
the necessary element of recklessness. In cases of assault, if the accused
knows that his actions or inaction are likely to make him aggressive,
unpredictable or uncontrolled with the result that he may cause injury to
others and he persists in the action or takes no remedial action when he knows
it is required, it will be open to the jury to find that he was reckless.
The above
issues, although not discussed in great detail in textbooks are extremely
examinable.
The extent
of the defence :
Please
take note that for examination purposes, the categories, which are particularly
important, are "hypo/hyperglycemia", "sleepwalking" and
"concussion".
(a) In relation to hypoglyceamia, the
relevant case to look at is the case of R
v Quick & Paddison. Here it was held that a person who is in a state of
hypoglycaemia due to too much insulin or a failure to eat after taking insulin
is really relying on the defence of automatism and not insanity.
(b)
For hyperglycaemia, in the case of R v Hennesy, it was held that
hyperglycaemia due to a failure to take insulin is really the defence of
insanity.
(c)
Sleep-walking : In the case of R v Burgess (1991), The Court of Appeal, was of the conclusion that
a person who acts while sleep-walking is not advancing the defence of
automatism but really that of insanity. The reasons were as follows :
- Sleep-walking is not caused by
an external factor. Whatever the cause may have been, it was an internal
cause.
- The danger of recurrence was an
added reason for categorising the condition as a disease of the mind. On
the other hand the absense of the danger of recurrence is not a reason for
saying that it cannot be a disease of the mind.
- While accepting that sleep was
a normal condition, they said that the evidence in the instant case
indicated that sleep-walking., particularly violence in sleep is not
normal.
- To the question of whether the
sleep-walker should be detained in hospital, the answer was yes, because sleep-walking was
treatable.
Certain
situations are not accepted as giving rise to a valid defence of
non-insane automatism, eg.
(i) Ordinary stress & disappointments
in life :
Rabey
v The Queen (1980).
Note :The
above decision must be contrasted by the case of R v T where the defendant was in a dissassosiative state due to
trauma caused by rape. Here the defendant successfully relied on the defence of
Automatism.
(ii) Falling asleep at the wheel :
Hill
v Baxter
Kay
v Butterworth.
(iii) Reflex actions :
Ryan
v R
Gray
v Barr
R v
Jarmain.
(iv) Driving without awareness :
AG's
Reference No.2/1992).